Secular Liberalism and the Argument from the Golden-Rule-Contract

Secular liberalism is the view that because reasonable people disagree on fundamental issues such as the nature of reality, human beings, and deeply held moral and religious beliefs, then the state ought not to embrace any one of these views as the correct one in its legislation.[1] This is because it is wrong for a position to be imposed as a law that constrains another’s liberty if it is derived from a religious, philosophical, or moral tradition that people reasonably disagree over. Secular liberalism is a very common political philosophy that rears its head everywhere in our society. Proponents think it is the most rational way to organize the public square of a society in which the citizens have conflicting and contradictory worldviews. Three arguments are usually offered in favor of secular liberalism: the golden-rule contract argument; the secular reason argument; and the err-on-the-side-of-liberty argument.[2] I’ll look at each one in turn starting with the golden-rule contract argument. I’ll be relying on philosopher Francis Beckwith’s analysis for insight.

The golden-rule-contract argument says that religious citizens ought not to use the power of the state to pass legislation that coerces other citizens who may disagree because religious citizens would not want the same thing happening to them. For example, pro-life Christians should not advance anti-abortion laws because pro-life Christians would not like it if Muslims advanced legislation to enact sharia law. Philosopher Robert Audi states it this way: “[It] is a kind of restraint I would wish to be observed by members of other religious groups who would want to coerce my behavior in the direction of their religiously preferred standards.”[3] This argument is vulnerable to several criticisms. First, religious people largely do not hold to their religious convictions as a mere preference. For example, Christians do not prefer the Ten Commandments over preferring Muslim sharia law. Audi misconstrues “religiously preferred standards” as something akin to a consumer at the supermarket shopping for his preferred flavor of ice cream. Thus, this view of religion loses the meaning of what a “standard” is usually thought to be.

Second, Audi’s principle is too abstract to apply in any specific way. Beckwith suggests the following illustration:

Suppose Fred, a white slave owner who embraces a religion that requires its male members practice polygamy, does not agree with a religiously motivated abolitionist, Sam, who wants to criminalize slavery because he believes that black slaves, like their white owners, are made in the image of God and ought to be accorded all the rights that accompany such a status. Fred, relying on Audi’s principle, explains to Sam: “How would you like it if I used the coercive power of the law to require that the male members of your sect practice polygamy, as is required by my faith? You would not like it, would you? So, why don’t you follow my example and show the kind of restraint to me that I have shown to you. Just as I should not force you to practice polygamy, you should not force me to abandon my ownership of slaves.”[4]

Thus, the application of Audi’s principle leaves one in a state where such things as polygamy as well as slavery could not be legislated against. This is surely an absurd notion. The fact is that just because one person may not like the state’s coercion due to some religiously or morally motivated reason does not mean he should not seek the state coercion of others. For all citizens, religious or not, believe their political beliefs are correct and should be embraced by the community of citizens for the common good. Ruling out the religiously motivated simply because it is religiously motivated is unjustifiably prejudicial.

Third, Audi’s principle assumes a controversial “desire” account of self-interested liberty.[5] A “desire” account equates a person’s good with the freedom to achieve what he or she desires according to a chosen life plan (a very Western notion). Though this is a common view of what liberty is, it seems no more reasonable than a “perfectionist” account of liberty. A “perfectionist” account says that a person’s good is not simply the freedom to achieve what one desires. Rather, what one desires ought to be to bring about one’s perfection (or proper end) and the common good. Thus, it is the role of the government to advance the common good. Beckwith puts it this way: “Because human beings are diverse in their abilities, talents and gifts, a free society with a perfectionist understanding would be one in which a full array of rights would be in place so that a wide variety of citizens would be able to lead flourishing lives and thus contribute to the common good.”[6] Thus, freedom of speech, religion, association, ownership of private property, etc. are liberties necessary so that citizens are able to make decisions in accordance with their own abilities and talents. However, these liberties are not ends in themselves, but are rather means to the end of the common good. Thus, perfectionists hold that certain non-liberal associations (families, churches, charitable organizations, and civic associations) are necessary for the moral and cultural shaping of the nation’s citizens to advance the common good. Therefore, certain practices that undermine such moral and cultural shaping can and should be legislated against. For Christians who follow Paul’s commandment “if it be possible…live peaceably with all men” (Romans 12:18), we must balance legislation with wisdom and respect such that the legislation is not draconian and that citizens who disagree with us know that Christians are seeking the common good and the protection of human dignity.[7] Thus, a perfectionist could use Audi’s principle this way:

Because I know that I have a weakness of will, and a propensity to do what is wrong if there are no legal barriers to discourage me, I am grateful when the state forbids a bad activity, such as abortion, active euthanasia, or the consumption of pornography. It liberates me from the call of temptation. Virtue is easier to attain when there is encouragement by members of the wider community and that encouragement is reflected in the legal framework. Because I believe that the legal framework ought to make it difficult for me to treat others and myself in a degrading and immoral way, and I am grateful when it does, I owe it to my fellow citizens to help make it easier for them to live a virtuous life as well. In this way, I am obeying the golden rule, since I am loving my neighbor as myself.[8]

Of course, “perfectionism” is a controversial view. But so is the “desire” account. Depending upon which view of human liberty one begins with, the use of Audi’s principle will not settle political disputes. Thus, consequently, the golden-rule contract argument does not support secular liberalism.

[1] Francis Beckwith, Politics for Christians: Statecraft as Soulcraft (Downers Grove, IL.: InterVarsity Press, 2010), p. 122.
[2] Ibid. p. 123.
[3] Robert Audi, Religion in the Public Square, ed. Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), p. 51; Citied by Beckwith, p. 123.
[4] Beckwith, pp. 124-125.
[5] Ibid., pg. 125.
[6] Ibid., pg. 126.
[7] Ibid., pg. 127.
[8] Ibid., pg. 128.