The Goodness of God and the Euthyphro Dilemma

An argument from moral ontology for God’s existence can be stated like this:
1. If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
2. Objective moral values do exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.

Premise 1 connects God’s existence to account for the existence of objective moral values. If God doesn’t exist, then objective moral values do not exist either. Premise 2 affirms that objective moral values exist. The conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, if the premises are true. Thus, this is a logically valid argument. A detractor to the conclusion must argue against the truth of either or both premises.

It seems many atheists continue to hold onto the truth of premise 2, but deny premise 1. This is evident in a previous post I made entitled “Being Good for Goodness’ Sake.” I argued that an atheist of a humanist persuasion finds himself stuck between theism on one hand and nihilism on the other. On one hand, like the theist, he wishes to affirm objective moral values. But on the other, like the nihilist, he wants to avoid theism as an explanatory account of the existence of objective moral values. But it is difficult to see how, given atheism, moral values evolved by human beings really are objective. It seems evident to me that atheism implies that objective moral values do not exist which is the moral nihilist position. Maria took issue with this and misunderstood my post to be saying something to the effect that atheists cannot be moral people. I explained that this was not what I argued and it confuses moral epistemology (how we know morality) with moral ontology (what is ultimately real or foundational about morality). I think atheists can live good moral lives and can recognize that such lives are good ones because all people are made in the image of God, and God has placed His moral law within our hearts (Romans 2:15).

In defense of premise one, I argued that God’s own nature that is essentially good is what grounds His divine commands that then become our moral duties and obligations. I said this escapes the Euthyphro dilemma by showing that goodness is neither arbitrary nor independent of God. Maria again took issue by saying that locating goodness in God’s very nature still falls back into the dilemma. Restated, the dilemma becomes: Is God’s nature good because it conforms to what goodness is or is God’s nature good just because it is God’s nature. Her complaint was that this just relegates goodness to whatever God is. I replied that this explanatory stopping point was no more arbitrary than locating the definition of goodness in the dictionary (as she was doing), human beings (as humanists do), or atheistic moral realism. Instead, I said that because only persons are interested in morality, then locating goodness in the very essential nature of a Personal God was a better account amongst arbitrary positions.

I think I was wrong. I was wrong by conceding too much on the arbitrariness charge. Here’s why. William Alston reminds us that God is the ultimate standard for what is good.[1] This means that God plays the role of what Plato called the Good. This is what is meant when theists say that God is essentially good, and He is the transcendent standard on which to measure moral goodness. Is this arbitary? Not at all! An illustration from a meter stick in my daughter’s classroom can help here. How do we know if this meter stick is accurately a meter in length? Well, it depends on how close it is to the international standard of a meter housed in Paris. A meter skeptic could ask, “How do we know that the international standard of a meter housed in Paris is accurately a meter?” But, it makes no sense to ask how the international standard of a meter housed in Paris is a meter. That’s just what it means to be a meter! Similarly, when someone buys a stereo that claims to be “high fidelity” what is the standard that this fidelity is measured by? Isn’t the standard of the real thing in which the stereo is attempting to reproduce such as an orchestra’s performance? It makes no sense, then, to ask why we should accept the orchestra’s performance as the standard of fidelity or to say that this just makes fidelity arbitrary. That’s just what it means to be a standard. Thus, locating goodness in God’s essential nature is a non-arbitrary stopping point when it comes to accounting for the existence of objective moral values.

I’d like to end by stating some preliminary thoughts that have been on my mind concerning the relation of necessary truths with God’s existence. Sometimes, it is argued that necessary truths, including moral ones, could still exist without God’s existence. Stephen Layman and Richard Swinburne hold this position.[2] I don’t agree. It seems to me that William Lane Craig is quite right that while we may hold such a view as an epistemic possibility, we cannot do so ontologically. Layman and Swinburne seem to assume that necessary truths, especially moral ones, do not have explanatory relations of priority amongst them.[3] I see no good reason why one should accept this. I see God’s existence and the existence of necessary truths as a package deal where these necessary truths are foundationally grounded in God.

[1] William Alston, “What Euthyphro Should Have Said,” in Philosophy of Religion, ed. William Lane Craig (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 291.
[2] C. Stephen Layman, “A Moral Argument for the Existence of God,” in Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? eds. Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 51-52; Richard Swinburne, “What Difference Does God Make to Morality?” in Is Goodness Without God Good Enough?, 155.
[3] William Lane Craig, “The Most Gruesome of Guests,” in Is Goodness Without God Good Enough?, 170.

Craig-Avalos Resurrection Debate

Introduction

Below is a summary and analysis of a debate that took place at Iowa State University in 2004 on the Resurrection of Jesus: Fact or Fiction? The disputants were Dr. William Lane Craig and Dr. Hector Avalos.

Summary of the Debate

Craig’s Opening Statement

In order to preempt using the same strategy in this debate, Craig references a previous debate in which Avalos allegedly used unprofessional tactics to try to discredit his opponent.

The Resurrection may still be a fact even if we can’t prove that it is. Thus, Avalos must do more than refute the evidence for the Resurrection. He must provide evidence against the Resurrection.

First contention, there are four established facts about Jesus:
1. After his crucifixion, Jesus was buried by Joseph of Arimathea in a tomb: (a) attested in old information handed on by Paul in 1 Cor. 15:3-7; (b) part of old source material used by Mark’s gospel; (c) Joseph of Arimathea is unlikely to be a Christian invention; (d) lacks any signs of legendary development; (e) no other competing burial story exists.
2. On the Sunday after his crucifixion, Jesus’ tomb was found empty by a group of his women followers: (a) Old information transmitted by Paul implies the empty tomb; (b) “On the third day” is probably a reference to women’s discovery of the empty tomb; (c) part of Mark’s source material; (d) simple and lacks signs of legendary development; (e) the tomb was probably discovered empty by women; (f) the earliest Jewish response presupposes the empty tomb (Matt 28:13).
3. On multiple occasions and under various circumstances, different individuals and groups experienced appearances of Jesus alive from the dead: (a) list of eyewitnesses quoted by Paul in old information; (b) multiple independent attestation in the gospels.
4. Original disciples suddenly and sincerely came to believe in the Resurrection of Jesus despite having every predisposition to the contrary: (a) Jesus was dead, and Jews had no belief in a dying much less rising messiah; (b) according to Jewish law, Jesus’ execution as a criminal exposed him as a heretic; (c) Jewish beliefs about the afterlife precluded anyone rising from the dead to glory and immortality before the general resurrection at the end of the world.

Second contention, the best explanation of these facts is that God raised Jesus from the dead. C. Behan McCullagh’s gives six criteria of what makes the best historical explanation and the Resurrection fulfills them: (explanatory scope, explanatory power, plausibility, not ad hoc or contrived, in accord with accepted beliefs, outstrips rival explanations in meeting all the other criteria).

Avalos’ Opening Statement

There is no sufficient evidence for Jesus’ resurrection. This is not a debate over naturalism vs. supernaturalism. Craig is a relativistic naturalist. He’s naturalistic when looking at other religious stories but not his own.

1. Some of the main facts that Craig uses to base his belief in the resurrection are no such thing. He just cataloged a bunch of facts that are not facts.
2. Many of his facts can be shown to be false and are not grounded in any substance whatsoever.
3. McCullagh’s criteria are completely bogus once you start applying them to tell the historical from the non-historical.

A fact is only what I have verified with my five senses and/or logic. We should choose known phenomena over unknown phenomena. Just because a gospel account may get some things right, doesn’t mean that we can assume that everything else is right. Determining what is historical must be made on a case-by-case basis. If the Resurrection is a fact, it must stand on its own merits.

The proper object of explanation is not the Resurrection but the stories of the Resurrection. There are many known explanations that can produce stories of Resurrection (hallucinations, visions, deductive errors, political motives, economic motives, literary phenomena).

Earliest documents about the Resurrection do not come from the time of Jesus. You have to go to a 3rd century document for the first Resurrection story.

Is Matthew 27:52-53 historical? Can his criteria tell the difference?

Craig’s 1st Rebuttal

Avalos has not carried his burden of proof to show that the Resurrection is a fiction.

Craig’s first contention:
1. Avalos did not give many specific refutations to the specific points. Instead he gave general comments that these are not facts but stories. But the majority of NT scholars say these stories are factually accurate for the reasons enumerated.
2. Avalos questioned the accuracy and reliability of the manuscripts that attest to these stories. But he knows the NT is the best attested book in ancient history in the number of manuscripts and dates of the manuscripts to the original compositions. But even if Avalos is right, then his own work is undermined since his primary sources for healthcare systems in the Ancient Near East are less attested.
3. Speaking as a historian, it is unknown whether Matthew 27 is historical or not, but this is not included as part of the evidence for the Resurrection.

Second contention:
1. Willing to include any explanation in the pool of live options, and the Resurrection is the best explanation of satisfying the six criteria.
2. Avalos voiced the classical foundationalist (evidentialist) position of epistemology. This view is (a) overly restrictive definition of rationality or knowledge and (b) self-refuting.
3. Avalos says we ought to prefer known causes to unknown ones. (a) Agrees that we should prefer known causes, but we shouldn’t harden this into a dogmatic presupposition because sometimes we are justified in positing new entities. (b) There are good independent reasons to believe in God making the Resurrection less ad hoc as an act of God.
4. Hallucination theory of the appearances. (a) The number and diversity of the circumstances of the appearances preclude against hallucinations. (b) Because of the Jewish belief in the afterlife, if the disciples hallucinated it would not have been a Resurrection. (c) This doesn’t explain the empty tomb and has less explanatory scope.

Avalos’ 1st Rebuttal

Craig is a relativistic naturalist:
1. Craig didn’t answer the question concerning Matthew 27. Why treat one story as historical and the other one as not?
a. Criterion of simplicity (brevity) – Matt. 27:52-53 is much briefer than Mark 16:1-8.
b. Criterion of simplicity (less apocalyptic/supernatural) – All of Mark is in apocalyptic context.
c. Same verb “to rise” is used in 1 Cor. 15 as Matt. 27:52-53.
d. “soma” is used to denote a physical bodily resurrection in 1 Cor. 15 and Matt. 27:52.
2. You can’t use empirical rationalism to defeat empirical rationalism.

Craig invents facts:
1. Craig says James, the brother of Jesus, was martyred for his faith in Jesus. He misreads Josephus who actually says James was executed for transgressing the law. Nothing in there about dying because of his faith in Jesus.
2. Craig’s move from the alleged 1st century event to the 3rd century document is done by his argument from the phrase “on the first day of the week” in Mark. This can get us back to the disciples’ time because it is awkward in Greek but smooth in Aramaic which is the original language of the disciples. (a) What is the perfectly smooth and normal Aramaic for “on the first day of the week?” (b) What specific Aramaic text did you consult to make that translation?

Craig’s 2nd Rebuttal

Avalos has not carried his burden of proof.

First contention:
1. Avalos dropped his point on the issue of textual purity.
2. What about Matt 27. Not sure? uses same verb and the word “soma” in 1 Cor. 15 – This point is not that these words shows the historicity of these events but these show that what is being described is meant to be a bodily resurrection.
3. Apocalyptic language is not just being more supernatural. It uses figurative speech not meant to be taken literally. Not sure if Matt 27 should be taken literally/historical information or apocalyptically. Mark’s account of the empty tomb is not cast in apocalyptic imagery.
4. “first day of the week” given in book that is not used tonight. It is used to show the earliness of the Markan account. 2nd Targum of Esther 2:9 uses the same phrase. Awkwardness in Greek is due to cardinal versus ordinal number. Supports the early nature of the account of the Markan tradition.
5. Avalos didn’t respond to the burial and the discovery of the empty tomb.
6. Josephus says James was killed by the Sanhedrin. Why? Book of Acts says James was a leader in the NT church.

Second contention:
1. Avalos’ empirical rationalism is overly restrictive and self-referentially incoherent. Belief in the Resurrection of Jesus is a reasonable belief.
2. Avalos did not respond that we should not harden criterion of preferences to a known cause. We do have evidence of the existence of God. Perfectly rational in holding what the original disciples believed that God raised Jesus from the dead.

Avalos’ 2nd Rebuttal

“first day of the week” in Aramaic:
1. Craig quoted a Medieval text not from the time of the disciples.
2. Craig gets almost every Aramaic term wrong in his book.
3. Aramaists know that there are no attested examples of “first day of the week” in Biblical Aramaic or all of Middle Aramaic. How do you know what the Aramaic phrase is for the original disciples?4.“first day of the week” is already used in the Greek tradition of the Bible that Mark knew about.

Craig’s Closing Statement

Avalos has not shown that the Resurrection is a fiction. All the evidence presented has been that the Resurrection is a fact.

First contention:
Avalos is reduced to quibbling about linguistic points over the Aramaic of an argument not even part of the case presented. Aramaic is attested in 2nd Targum of Esther and the Hebrew is attested in Gen. 8:5 that has a similar phrase. Most scholars see this phrase in Mark as a Semitism. But even if wrong on this, it is not part of the case presented.
The Aramaic errors in the book are due to printer’s errors that hopefully will be corrected in a future edition.

Second contention:
Avalos’ attempt to restrict the best explanation of the Resurrection is overly restrictive and self-refuting.
Hallucination theory has three powerful arguments against it.

There are two ways of knowing the Resurrection: (a) historical research and (b) personal existential experience.

Avalos’ Closing Statement

There is no sufficient historical evidence for Jesus’ Resurrection.

Some of the main facts Craig uses for the historicity Resurrection are not true.
Mark 16:2 Aramaic is from a later text.
Josephus on James’ death.

His criteria do not distinguish the historical from the non-historical (Matthew 27 vs. Mark 16).

Craig’s scholarship is smoke and mirrors and would only appeal to Campus Crusade people.

Assessment of the Debate

Since I am not an expert in the field of biblical studies, my assessment will be concerned with who argued more effectively instead of determining who had the right facts with them. Only other Bible scholars, in my estimation, can determine that question.

First, it was unfortunate that the tone of the debate started out so negatively. But I deemed it a good strategy for Craig to preempt any possibility of Avalos trying to embarrass or discredit him. Avalos did try this tactic on Craig several times by (1) stating his scholarship is smoke and mirrors that would only appeal to Campus Crusade types and (2) stating that the errors in Aramaic in Craig’s book showed that he wasn’t a reliable scholar intimating that Craig invents things just to suit his viewpoint. Thus, even if Avalos is correct, the audience was already primed by Craig to watch for this.

Second, Avalos went into technical depth attacking Craig’s use of “the first day of week” as evidence that the discovery of the empty tomb by women was historical. But this tactic seemed to be a bad one since it wasn’t part of Craig’s case that night. Craig relied on six other arguments instead of this one for the empty tomb. Thus, Avalos’ point seems to be irrelevant. Perhaps it was more of the same tactic by Avalos to try to discredit Craig as a scholar.

Third, against the empty tomb and the appearances, Avalos advocates that a whole host of other known things (hallucinations, visions, literay, etc.) can better explain them. Unfortunately, these were very general and not well-developed explanations. Avalos backed this up with his theory of knowledge that Craig accurately deemed as traditional foundationalism. Avalos did not have a good rebuttal to the argument that foundationalism is overly restrictive and self-referentially incoherent.

Fourth, against the claim by Craig that Jesus appeared to James such that James died for his faith in Jesus, Avalos did score some good points in that Josephus does not explicitly say that James died for his faith in Jesus. Avalos accused Craig of misreading Josephus here. Craig countered that we know that James did not believe in Jesus as Lord during Jesus’ lifetime but James becomes a leader of the Christian church as attested in the Acts of the Apostles. This conversion has to be explained. Avalos never rebutted this specific point.

Fifth, Avalos attempted to point out an inconsistency in using criteria to show why Craig says some stories are historical and others are not by contrasting Mark with Matt. 27. But even if Avalos is correct in showing a wishy-washy historical methodology being used, this doesn’t show that the appearances in 1 Cor. 15 are not historical.

Thus, it is my opinion on the mere flow of argument and counter argument that Craig won the debate.

The Value of Good Philosophy for the Christian Faith

To be ignorant and simple now—not to be able to meet the enemies on their own ground—would be to throw down our weapons, and to betray our uneducated brethren who have, under God, no defence but us against the intellectual attacks of the heathen. Good philosophy must exist, if for no other reason, because bad philosophy needs to be answered. -- C.S. Lewis

A Few Young Earth Creationist Arguments Dispatched

Some young earth creationists (YEC) offer several scientific reasons for not believing that the earth is only thousands of years old. I disagree and think these arguments are not good ones.

YEC Argument #1 - The Hubble constant, star ages, and the age of the universe are in conflict so we can’t trust the standard cosmological big bang model.

The discrepancy about the age of the universe being younger than the oldest stars in context is about a longstanding debate amongst astrophysicists about what the proper value of the Hubble constant should be. One group thinks it should be higher and the other says it should be lower and present conflicting experimental data. The latest (2003) and most accurate information from NASA’s WMAP satellite gives a value of the Hubble constant that translates into an age of the universe being about 13.7 billion years old. This is well within the estimate of the age of the oldest stars that is derived from different and independent empirical and theoretical means. This is not a problem. http://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/universe/uni_age.html

YEC Argument #2 - The speed of light – c- was or could be faster in the past so we can’t trust how much time it would take to travel the galactic distances.

This YEC argument is largely abandoned because of much criticism. One such criticism is that if the speed of light were larger in the past, then stars would be more luminous than they are now which means any life that was around would be fried from the great heat. In fact the YEC organization, Answers in Genesis, recommends that one not use it and instead is hitching their cart to YEC scientist Russell Humphrey’s alternative cosmological model that concedes the galactic star distances are correct and that the speed of light has been constant in the past. This is a big step. In fact, Humphrey’s model concedes the universe is billions of years old, but he’s trying to keep the earth thousands of years old. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C-decay

YEC Argument #3 - Radioisotopes decayed at different rates in the past so we can’t trust the dates given.

Radioactive elements exist both on the earth as well as in supernovae. If the galactic distances are correct and if the speed of light is constant (as referenced and conceded by some YEC organizations above), then when we look at supernovae and the elements coming out of them we are looking at them in the past (i.e. when one looks at a star one is looking at the star when the light left it millions or billions of years ago). The rates of radioactive decay from supernovae are observed to be virtually the same as the radioactive decay rates we see on the earth right now. There is no good reason to think the rates were substantially different in the past since astronomers can look into the past. http://www.asa3.org/ASA/RESOURCES/WIENS.html