During the recent Christmas season, I have not had a chance to write a post on the atheist bus campaign that was in the news. The American Humanist Association has been running a bus campaign in Washington, DC that asks people “Why believe in a god? Just be good for goodness’ sake.”
Of course, the obvious question that I would ask the humanist is, “What do you mean by good?” For humanism is a form of optimistic atheism in which the source of moral values are located with human beings themselves with no further grounding for the objective nature of moral values than that. However, if God does not exist, then why should we think that moral values are in any way objective? After all, according to atheistic views of human origins, moral values are the product of our biological and social evolution. But there is nothing that necessitates that our moral values would develop the way they actually did. There is no purpose in evolution but survival of the fittest. Thus, our moral values exist because of survival value with no deeper meaning than that. Any deeper meaning is ultimately illusory. They are just accidental by-products of evolution. How could accidental moral values be in any way objective? If human beings are the explanatory ultimate when it comes to grounding the objective nature of moral values, then how does atheism account for this apart from some view based on self-interest? Atheistic accounts that attempt to ground moral values in prudential value is ultimately based on self-interest. But the very understanding of an objective moral value, such as moral goodness, is that it is good in itself whether it is in one’s self-interest or not.
Thus, why should human beings opt for an optimistic view of moral values given atheism? Why not adopt nihilism – the view that existence has no objective meaning, purpose, or intrinsic value? If there is no transcendent standard of what is good or evil, how does the humanist justify one take the optimistic view instead of a pessimistic one? Thus, the humanist is really fighting a two front war. On one front, he affirms the existence of objective moral values, contrary to the nihilist, but on the other front He doesn’t want to ground those values in a transcendent personal God as the source of those objective moral values. He is caught uncomfortably between nihilism and theism.
The humanist may reply with his own dilemma leveled to believers in God found in Plato’s dialogues called the Euthyphro. In modern parlance, the dilemma goes like this: Does God command something because it is good or is something good because God commands it? If one says that God commands something because it is good, then we are appealing to a standard that is independent of God that God Himself must hold to. This is what the humanist bus campaign meant by the words “Why believe in a god? Just be good for goodness’ sake.” If one says that something is good because God commands it, then goodness is arbitrary since it just depends on whatever God commands and He could have commanded evil things.
Euthyphro has been answered adequately, I think, since the time of St. Augustine. But it seems from my reading atheists seem almost clueless about the solution. Here it is: The Euthyphro dilemma is a false one because there is a third alternative: Objective moral values are not located in God’s commands, but they are located in God’s very nature. By God’s very nature, He is essentially good, generous, holy, etc. Thus, the commands of God flow out of His very nature and constitute our moral duties. It is logically impossible for God to command things that are not consistent with His nature. So, asking the incoherent question, “Would rape be good if God commanded it” is like asking “If there were a square circle would the area equal the square of one of its sides.” Thus, God does not arbitrarily command things nor is goodness independent of God. Christian philosopher and theologian William Lane Craig defends this type of divine command theory in the book Is Goodness without God Good Enough? edited by Nathan King and Robert Garcia.
It may be asked “Is God’s nature good because it conforms to goodness, or is His nature good just because it is His nature.” Here we simply must state that God’s nature is essentially good. Just as it would be impossible for a triangle to not have the internal angles sum to 180 degrees, God is essentially good such that it would be impossible for God to exist without goodness. God being the source of goodness is the explanatory ultimate. We have reached the bedrock of explanation. Thus, the only way for us to be good for goodness’ sake is if goodness resides in the existence of a necessarily good God. Humanists may not recognize this, but the ontological foundations of morality demand it.
Other blogs about it:
"Why Believe in Atheists?" by Letitia Wong at Talitha, Koum!
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2 comments:
I think you meant to say, "We must CLAIM (not 'state') that God's nature is essentially good," because that is all you can do. Unlike the sum of the internal angles of a triangle, you cannot prove that God even exists, let alone prove that his nature is essentially good. You can argue that it is and you can present your idea of evidence in support of your argument but this will be undermined by a wealth of evidence that would seem to contradict your claim. That's one reason why this particular attempt at solving Euthyphro's dilemma fails, as does your analogy with Euclidian geometry. Anyway, saying that, "He is essentially good, generous, holy, etc. Thus, the commands of God flow out of His very nature and constitute our moral duties," is, in effect, no different from the horn of the dilemma that asks whether something is good because God says it is. All you are doing is saying why God, in your opinion, is right when he says something is good. So, "'Good' is what God says it is and he should know because goodness is his essential nature," right? Thus, some acts that do nothing but cause hurt and suffering - such as depriving gay couples of the right to marry - are 'good' because God says so and he should know because he is goodness. I'm afraid that, logically, this argument doesn't cut it.
You would ask a humanist, "What do you mean by good?" As a humanist, I will answer that I subscribe to the dictionary definition: "bringing well-being, happiness or pleasure; not hurting."
Your argument about whether or not atheistic morality can be objective is a red herring introduced to divert attention away from the simple, straightforward message of the American Humanists, a message that is easily understood by anyone with an ounce of human empathy: 'Be kind, don't hurt people, because everyone will be happier that way.' That is all there is to it. There is nothing self-interested about this message, which is one that comes from human nature and experience. Rather than misuse logic and reasoning to try to undermine the message, your time might be more usefully employed in trying to explain to those of us who manage to lead very happy, worthwhile and productive lives without any god-belief should do anything differently. As the ad says, 'Why believe in a god?'
Come to thinkhumanism.com and try it.
Thanks, Maria for you comment.
First, I did not say that humanists cannot live "happy, worthwhile, and productive lives without any god-belief." My post was about meta-ethical issues of moral ontology. I do not doubt that humanists can live what we would all consider as morally good lives without belief in God. What I do contend, however, is that humanists cannot adequately account for the existence of moral goodness apart from the existence of God. How do you make the philosophical move from natural properties (matter, space, time, energy, chance) to a non-natural thing like objective moral goodness? I can certainly see how one may move from natural properties to prudential goodness, but prudential goodness is ultimately concerned with what will make something good for me and not simply with what is good in itself. I am interested in the foundations that ground moral goodness, and I don't see how any form of atheism can adequately account for that.
Second, the definition I am drawing upon for God is one that is associated with St. Anselm. God is the being most worthy of worship -- the greatest possible being. Thus, a being most worthy of worship must be essentially good. Now, you may disagree with this definition, but it is the one that classical Christian theists use. Philosopher Thomas Morris has a book explaining and defending this notion called _Anselmian Explorations_.
Third, in explaining where to locate the foundations of objective moral values we must find a stopping point of explanation somewhere. As a humanist, you rely on the dictionary that says goodness is "bringing well-being, happiness or pleasure; not hurting." There is nothing deeper than that. I agree that the dictionary captures some good-making features of what it means to be good. But, why are those good-making features constitutive of goodness? We can keep asking 'why' until we reach one of two answers. The atheistic moral realist will say that goodness is just there in the universe and that's all. Goodness is an abstract principle that just exists in some Platonic heaven somewhere and we are fortunate enough to apprehend such things and obey them. I consider this option to be incredibly nuts! That is saying a mindless universe that did not have the evolution of human beings in mind just happened to produce beings that were able to apprehend the moral realm! That's like saying the universe knew we were coming! In addition, how does an abstract principle, like Justice, impose on me a moral obligation to be just? In contrast, a theistic moral realist like myself would say that the bedrock of explanation is located in the very nature of God because He is the most perfect being. Is this arbitrary? No more so than locating the stopping point of goodness in human beings, a dictionary definition, or atheistic Platonic forms. In fact, I think it is the best stopping point for explanation because, it seems that only persons are interested in moral things, and thus it makes sense that the ultimate explanation of morality would be in a personal God.
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